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Panpsychism, the idea that everything has an aspect of psyche or mind to it, 
seems nutty to most people. In our everyday experience some things are alive 
and some aren’t, and the difference is obvious even if there are some grey areas. 
Living things have minds. At least we ourselves do, as we know from direct 
experience, and it is not too much of a stretch to say that all living things do. 
But what sense does it make to say that dead things have minds? 
I have written about panpsychism a couple of times before1, and some readers 
have asked for a more rigorous defense of the theory than I have given in those 
articles. It is all very well to say that Panpsychism is a more coherent 
metaphysics than others, but what does that actually mean? OK, here goes. 
This is a bit more technical than usual, and longer, so please bear with me. 
First, some context. This is all about the mind-body problem. Mental objects, 
such as thoughts and feelings, have no extension in space and are directly 
perceivable only by the person thinking or feeling them. Physical (bodily) 
objects have extension in space and are perceivable by more than one person. 
The question is, how are they related? 
Here is the argument in its bare logical form as adapted from contemporary 
philosopher Galen Strawson:2 
0. Reality is made of only one type of stuff. There is 
only one ultimate category that applies to 
everything. We call this view Monism. 
assumption 
1. Everything real has a material aspect. That is, every 
instance of the one type of stuff of which reality is 
made is observable from an external, publicly-
available point of view. 
premise 
2. Our own experience, directly observable only from 
the point of view of the one who is having it, is 
indisputably real. 
premise 
                                               
1 Meacham, William, “Dead or Alive?”, URL = http://www.bmeacham.com/blog/?p=320 and 
“Mental Causation”, URL = http://www.bmeacham.com/blog/?p=510.  
2 Presented at a colloquium for the Department of Philosophy at the University of Texas at 
Austin on 20 October 2011. I am paraphrasing Strawson’s terminology. Strawson starts by 
agreeing with materialists that concrete reality is entirely physical in nature and then argues for 
a meaning of “physical” that includes both the material and the mental. I prefer to use the term 
“physical” as most people do, to mean material only. 
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3. Hence, at least some of reality has an experiential 
aspect as well as a material aspect. 
lemma (1,2) (A lemma is 
a conclusion that is then 
used as a premise in a 
further chain of argument.) 
4. There is no radical emergence of experience from 
non-experiential stuff. The experiential aspect of 
something does not radically emerge from the 
material aspect. (By “radical” I mean strong, as 
opposed to weak, emergence. See discussion below.) 
premise 
5. Hence, experience is as fundamental to reality as 
matter. 
conclusion (3,4) 
   
5. Experience is fundamental to reality. lemma 
6. What is real is ultimately made up of very tiny 
elements; these are its fundamental constituents. 
premise 
7. Hence, at least some fundamental constituents of 
reality are intrinsically and irreducibly experiential 
as well as material in nature. For short, we call this 
idea “micropsychism.” 
conclusion (5,6) 
   
7. Micropsychism is true. lemma 
8. The assertion that all fundamental constituents of 
reality are experiential as well as material is simpler 
than and preferable to the assertion some are and 
some are not. 
premise 
9. Hence, all fundamental constituents of reality are 
intrinsically and irreducibly experiential in nature 
as well as material. For short, we call this 
“panpsychism.” 
conclusion (7,8) 
Well that is terse, but it shows the logical structure of the argument. As in all 
logical arguments, the final conclusion is demonstrated to be true only if the 
logic is sound and all the premises are true. There is a surprisingly large body 
of recent work on this subject examining each of the premises in detail. I am 
certainly not going to reproduce it all, but I will go over the premises and give 
some reasons why I think each of them makes sense. 
We start off by assuming monism, the view that everything is made of the same 
kind of stuff. Depending on whom you ask, that might be matter (wholly non-
experiential), the view known as materialism; mind (wholly non-material), the 
view known as idealism; or something in between that takes on aspects of both 
matter and mind. The alternative is dualism, which says that matter and mind 
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are two entirely distinct kinds of stuff. The problem with dualism, of course, is 
how to explain the interaction between the two. I take it that monism is not a 
controversial assumption. 
The first premise says that everything has a material, or physical, aspect; so the 
argument starts off agreeing with the materialists. I am giving an operational 
definition of “material”: what is material is detectable or observable by more 
than one person. The first premise says that what is real is objectively there, 
and can be discerned by anyone with suitable training and instruments. 
You would think that the second premise, that our own experience is 
indisputably real, would be equally uncontroversial, but that is not the case. 
Surprisingly, some people say that experience isn’t really real. Most 
notoriously, Daniel Dennett, a materialist, makes the following assertion, where 
“phenomenology” means the various items in conscious experience:3 “There 
seems to be phenomenology. That is a fact …. But it does not follow … that 
there really is phenomenology.”4 
As Strawson points out, seeming itself is a type of experience, so the argument 
fails on the face of it.5 Dennett’s claim is not so absurd as it sounds, because 
Dennett is arguing that what is really real is the brain activity that creates our 
experience. He says, for instance, that our experience seems smooth and 
continuous, but the physiology behind it is discontinuous and full of gaps. 
Hence, our experience is not really continuous at all.6 But that just begs the 
question. In order to know anything about brain activity we have to see 
readings on dials, squiggles on paper, etc., and seeing is a kind of experience. 
The one thing we cannot doubt, when we are experiencing something, is that 
experience is going on. We can find out that we are mistaken about the objects 
of our experience, as when we see a hallucination or an optical illusion, but 
that we are experiencing is the bedrock of everything. 
The conclusion from the first two premises is that experience is an undeniable 
aspect of whatever the universe is made of. And so is matter, of course. Now 
the question is, what is the relationship between experience and matter? A 
common claim is that experience emerges from non-experiential matter when 
matter reaches a certain degree of complexity. Premise 4 denies this claim. 
The basic idea of emergence is that new properties arise in systems as a result 
of interactions at an elemental level.7 A case in point is liquidity. A single 
molecule of water is not liquid, nor are its constituent atoms. But when you put 
several molecules of water together, you have a liquid (at certain temperatures). 
Liquidity is an emergent property, specifically a form of “weak” emergence: the 
                                               
3 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, p. 45. 
4 Ibid., p. 366. 
5 Strawson, “Realistic Monism,” p. 6, footnote 7. 
6 Dennett, Consciousness Explained, p. 356. 
7 Wikipedia, “Emergence.” 
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emergent quality is directly traceable to characteristics of the system’s 
components. Water molecules do not bind together in a tight lattice but slide 
past each other; that’s just part of their physical make-up. 
Some say that consciousness is an emergent property as well, that it arises 
when constituent parts – neurons, sense organs and the like – are organized 
with sufficient complexity. If so, the emergence of consciousness would be a 
“strong” emergence. The new quality, consciousness, would not be reducible to 
the system’s constituent parts; the whole would be greater than the sum of its 
parts. 
Strawson denies the possibility of such strong emergence. He says “there must 
be something about the nature of the emerged-from (and nothing else) in virtue 
of which the emerger emerges as it does and is what it is. You can get liquidity 
from non-liquid molecules as easily as you can get a cricket team from eleven 
things that are not cricket teams.”8 We can do so because in those cases “we 
move wholly within a completely conceptually homogeneous … set of 
notions.”9 But there is nothing about the nature of inert, non-experiential 
matter that would lead to the emergence of conscious experience. The two 
notions are not homogenous, but radically different. So consciousness does not 
emerge from non-conscious matter. 
That, at least, is the argument in favor of premise 4. If you want to dispute it 
(and philosophers certainly have done so), you know where to take aim. But if 
we assume that it is true, then conclusion 5 follows: Experience is as 
fundamental to reality as matter; it is not something additional that emerges 
from what is primitive or more fundamental. In Strawson’s argument this is a 
stopping place; the rest is elaboration. 
The next premise, 6, is that the ultimate constituents of reality are quite tiny: 
electrons, protons, quarks, muons and the like. This reflects the current 
findings of the physical sciences, and there is no reason to doubt it. 
Hence (conclusion 7), at least some fundamental constituents of reality are 
intrinsically and irreducibly experiential in nature as well as material. For 
short, we call this idea “micropsychism.” 
Micropsychism should make the idea of panpsychism a bit more palatable. The 
theory does not assert that inert substances such as rocks and concrete walls 
are conscious or have any kind of experience. It does assert that the ultimate 
components of such materials do have a kind of experience, some way of taking 
into account of their surroundings in a manner that, were it expanded and 
amplified quite a bit, would be like our waking consciousness of our world. 
                                               
8 Strawson, “Realistic Monism,” p. 15. 
9 Idem. 
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Premise 8 is an application of Occam’s Razor, which advises us to adopt the 
simplest theory that adequately explains all the facts. Conclusion 7 says we 
have reason to think that at least some elemental parts of reality are 
experiential as well as material. We have no positive reason not to think that 
they all are. So it makes the theory simpler and more elegant to apply it to 
everything. Hence we end up with full-blown panpsychism (conclusion 9): all 
fundamental constituents of reality are intrinsically and irreducibly 
experiential, as well as material, in nature. 
There is no way to tell for sure, of course. We cannot perform a scientific 
experiment to demonstrate that tiny particles or waves or whatever they are 
have some kind of experience of their surroundings. Physics tells us, with 
mathematical precision, how they interact, but physics tells us nothing of their 
internality. It’s just that it makes a more coherent and refined theory to assume 
that every element, rather than only some of them, has some sort of experience. 
As I like to say, everything has an inside and an outside, the inside being the 
world as experienced by the entity itself and the outside being the way that the 
entity is experienced by other entities. 
That’s the argument in a nutshell. The whole thing hinges on premise 4, the 
denial of strong emergence. Materialism requires strong emergence to account 
for human consciousness. Panpsychism requires emergence as well, but only of 
a weak sort. If the fundamental units of reality are experiential as well as 
material, then it makes sense in principle that elaborate combinations of them 
would result in the vivid consciousness that we all enjoy while awake. But 
what is the nature of that combination? Without an account of that, 
panpsychism has little more explanatory plausibility than materialism. 
If everything has both an inside, as panpsychism suggests, and an outside, as 
both panpsychism and materialism agree, then the organization of the outside 
should have some bearing on the richness of the inside. Let’s go back to the 
initial conundrum, the difference between what is living and what is not. Is 
there something unique about how matter is organized in living beings that 
would account for the emergence of the complex and vivid form of experience 
that we know as waking consciousness? The answer is yes; it is what persists 
through time. The physical matter of non-living things persists through time, 
and their form changes through the impact of external forces. Living beings are 
the opposite: their physical matter is constantly changing through time, and 
only their form persists. 
The physical matter of dead things just persists from moment to moment 
without changing, or changing only through external forces. In any given slice 
of time, the substance of a dead thing is the same as it is in any other slice of 
time. The totality of what it is can be encompassed in a single instant. 
Living things are strikingly different. The physical matter that composes living 
things is constantly changing through metabolism, the process by which matter 
InDefenseOfPanpsychism.doc  Page 6 of 7 
Last saved: 5/7/2012 10:58 AM  Printed: 05/07/12, 10:58 AM 
is ingested, transformed and excreted. What persists is not the matter itself but 
the form in which that matter is organized. A single slice of time does not 
encompass the unity of the living being at all. Only across time can we grasp its 
functional wholeness. I follow Hans Jonas here.10 The sense of being a whole 
conscious entity emerges with metabolism, the ability of a simple organism to 
maintain its structure through time by exchanging physical matter with its 
environment. The physical matter changes, but the organizational form doesn’t. 
(Or, it does, but it evolves so there is a continuity.) The structure of the material 
aspect – a changing material process that has a unity of form over time – gives 
rise to a unity of experience over time, a macroexperience, which is of a higher 
order than the microexperiences of the constituent elements. 
Jonas’ insights map nicely to those of other panpsychists, the process 
philosophers. Charles Hartshorne has made the distinction between 
“compound” and “composite” individuals, which is roughly the distinction 
between what is living and what is not.11 A compound individual is one which 
(or who), on a macro level, has a “dominating unit,” an inclusive locus of 
experience, a single subject that unifies the experiences of its components into 
a coherent whole. Non-living things, although made up of actual ultimates that 
each have a mental or experiential aspect, have no such unification of 
experience. Hartshorne calls them “composite” rather than “compound.” David 
Ray Griffin calls them “aggregate.”12 In compound (living) individuals the 
experiences of the components bind together and reinforce each other, giving 
birth to a higher-level experience, a dominant subjectivity among the 
micropsychic components, which is in some ways superior to and capable of 
directing them. In composite (dead) things, or aggregations, the experiences of 
all the component simple individuals remain separate, and no higher-level 
inclusive experience arises. It is the persistence of form in compound 
individuals that enables the merging of the mentality of the micropsychic units 
into an inclusive subjectivity that, in its most developed instantiation, includes 
all the richness of human mental life, including a sense of freedom and a 
knowledge of its own mortality. 
### 
                                               
10 Jonas, “Evolution and Freedom,” pp. 64-67. (Jonas, by the way, is fascinating. A student 
under Heidegger, he is rooted in both existential phenomenology and in biology, so his 
language is quite a bit different from Strawson’s. He is germane because he takes seriously the 
possibility that other beings besides the human have subjective experience, what he, along 
with many existentialists and phenomenologists, calls “interiority.” The germ of many aspects 
of human interiority is found in the simplest of living beings: a sense of freedom, of 
independence from the givenness of the material, along with a sense of necessity, of 
dependence on the material for one’s existence; a sense of Being, of life, in opposition to the 
ever-present possibility of Non-being, of death; a sense of value, of the attractiveness of what is 
nourishing and repulsiveness of what is dangerous; a sense of selfhood, of inner identity that 
transcends the collective identity of the always-changing components, and a sense of the world 
that is other than oneself. Delicious stuff, but too much to cover in any depth in this essay.) 
11 Hartshorne, “The Compound Individual,” pp. 215-217. 
12 Griffin, Whitehead’s Radically Different Postmodern Philosophy, pp. 58-61. 
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